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Abstract We start with Fodor’s critique of cognitive science in [8]: he
argues that much mental activity cannot be handled by the current
methods of cognitive science because it is nonmonotonic and, there-
fore, is global in nature, is not context-free, and is thus not capable
of being formalised by a Turing-like mental architecture. We look at
the use of non-monotonic logic in the Artificial Intelligence community,
particularly with the discussion of the so-called “frame problem”. The
mainstream approach to the frame problem is, we argue, probably sus-
ceptible to Fodor’s critique: however, there is an alternative approach,
due to McCain and Turner, which is, when suitably reformulated, not
susceptible. In the course of our argument, we give a proof theory for
the McCain-Turner system, and show that it satisfies cut elimination.
We have two substantive conclusions: firstly, that Fodor’s argument de-
pends on assumptions about logical form which not all non-monotonic
theories satisfy; and, secondly, that metatheory plays an important role
in the context of evolutionary accounts of rationality.
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0 Introduction
Fodor has argued [8] that mental processes fall into two classes: those which
are modular (that is, effectively encapsulated from other mental processes),
and those which are not. The modular ones take place by means of local,
syntactic operations on mental representations [8, pp. 18f.]: if they function
properly, they will be insensitive to what may or may not happen outside their
module. In fact, more than this is true: such processes are context invariant [8,
pp. 34f.]. All they care about is the syntax of the mental representations which
they are working on. In particular, they are monotonic: the validity of the
inferences they perform is unaffected by adding extra mental representations
to their context.
The non-modular ones, by contrast, are not monotonic. Fodor’s examples
of such non-modular processes are, firstly, abduction, and, secondly, the belief
change apparatus associated with abductive inference (including judgements
as to the centrality of particular beliefs in one’s belief system). These pro-
cesses are, plausibly, non-monotonic and context-sensitive [8, pp. 33ff.]: and
thus, Fodor goes on to argue, they cannot be described as operations on the
(context-invariant) syntax of mental representations.
Now one could quibble about all this in various ways: one could worry
about whether Fodor had distinguished sufficiently well between abstract and
concrete syntax [22], one could wonder whether he had taken sufficiently into
account the possibility of context dependence which was regular enough not
to have the deleterious consequences that he wishes to avoid [30] – but, for
all that, his argument is cogent and worrying.
Rather than raising these sort of objections to Fodor’s argument, it may be
more illuminating to look at how the artificial intelligence community deals
with this sort of problem. We will look at what is described in the AI com-
munity as the “frame problem”: although this problem, which is mainly con-
cerned with reasoning about change in the world, is somewhat different from
the belief change problems that Fodor discusses, the two areas are systemat-
ically related [3], so that discussions of one should, mutatis mutandis, apply
to the other.
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Our results are interesting. We investigate two approaches to the frame
problem: one of them, the more mainstream one, is based on the idea of min-
imising change, and probably is susceptible to critique in Fodor’s manner.
However, the other one, due to McCain and Turner, is probably not thus sus-
ceptible: it shows illuminatingly how reasoning can be nonmonotonic without
being catastrophically global.
In arguing for this position, we have work, both technical and philosophical,
to do. The McCain-Turner system is usually presented model-theoretically:
we develop a proof theory for it, in order to show directly what reasoning in
that system is like. In particular, we prove a cut elimination result, which can
be regarded as showing how the system can support nonmonotonic inference
and still be tractable. Proofs of these results are quite technical, and have
been modularised into the appendix of this paper.
We also have philosophical work to do. McCain and Turner present their
system as a system of what they term “causal reasoning”: I argue that the
system can, much more plausibly, be presented as a logic of explanation. This,
of course, brings it much closer to Fodor’s concern with large-scale cognitive
architecture, in which explanation ought to play a central role. So, in order
to make this claim more plausible, I describe an interesting logic of argument
due to Parsons and Jennings: this logic turns out to be merely a notational
variant of a fragment of the McCain-Turner system.
1 The Logical Background
1.1 Basics Regardless of the details of the common approaches to reason-
ing about action, they all have several things in common. They all assume
that one should start with a logical description of actions and their effects:
they all (or mostly all) assume that the logical apparatus should deliver a
description of the sequence of states of affairs resulting from a given sequence
of actions. We will, for the sake of simplicity, assume that we have linear
discrete time, indexed by the natural numbers: propositions will have an ar-
gument place for the time, into which terms standing for temporal instants
can be substituted. Devotees of more sophisticated approaches – for exam-
ple, of Reiter’s elegant situation calculus formulation [27] – are welcome to
translate my oversimplified notation into their variant.
1.2 The Frame Problem A fundamental difficulty behind using logic to rea-
son about action in this way is what is known as the frame problem. The
problem is that, given the state of the world before an action, there are many,
merely “logically possible”, states of the world after it; but most of these
states are physically unrealistic. This remains so even if we give what seem
to be perfectly adequate logical formalisations of actions.
Here is a famous example of what is at issue.
Example 1.1 (The Yale Shooting Problem). Suppose that we describe a state
of the world at a particular time t by propositions alive and loaded. The world (a
particularly simple one) contains a victim, a gun (and, presumably, a shooter,
but he or she can remain unformalised). alivet will say that some victim is still
alive at t, whereas loadedt will say that a gun is loaded at that time. Consider
actions shoot and wait: wait has no effect, whereas shoot, if the gun is loaded,
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kills the victim. So we can specify the shoot action as follows (for the sake of
simplicity, we assume that every action takes one unit of time):
shoott ∧ loadedt ⊢ ¬alivet+1 (1)
Suppose now we have the following scenario: the gun is loaded at time 0, then
there is a wait action, and the gun is then shot. So the following sequence of
truth values is compatible with our specification:
t 0 1 2
wait shoot
alive ⊤ ⊤ ⊥
loaded ⊤ ⊤ ⊥
(2)
Unfortunately, so is this:
t 0 1 2
wait shoot
alive ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
loaded ⊤ ⊥ ⊥
(3)
However one might wish to diagnose the situation here, it is clear that some-
thing has gone wrong: logic, supplemented by unproblematic-seeming axioma-
tisations of the effects of actions, generates more solutions to these problems
than it should. We need extra constraints, and there have been at least
two attempts to say what sort of constraints we should have: a mainstream
approach, based on the idea of minimisation, and an alternative approach,
rather less clearly formulated, but technically more viable and more interest-
ing. As I shall argue, the alternative approach is, in fact, based on the idea
of explanation.
1.3 Minimisation-Based Approaches We first outline, and criticise, the
minimisation-based approaches: this will not only show some of the issues
at stake, but it will also give an example of an approach which is, arguably,
susceptible to Fodor’s critique.
The basic idea behind these approaches is simple: that we should pick
those histories which minimise the amount of change. One can, presum-
ably, motivate this criterion as follows: the axiomatisations of actions give
the changes which must take place if the actions are to be performed, and
one wants exactly these changes and no others. Hence one should have a
minimal amount of change. This idea is very close to Lewis’ treatment of
counterfactuals [12; 14; 13], and thus has a respectable philosophical pedi-
gree. It can, furthermore, be supported by a mathematical argument: a wide
class of non-monotonic logics can be specified by giving a preference relation
on models of some monotonic theory, and then selecting only those models
which are minimal according to the preference relation [4]. So, this approach
seems to have the advantage of a strong philosophical motivation, together
with mathematical generality.
However, problems arise when one tries to make this approach more spe-
cific. Example 1.1 shows the first of these problems: there are two histories
in that example, and the wrong one has one change of truth value, while
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the correct one has two changes. Even if we minimise by looking at contain-
ment relations between sets of changes, rather than naively counting them,
the problem persists. So minimisation often gives incorrect results. One can,
perhaps, fix it, but many of the fixes (for example, preferring later changes to
earlier ones) seem to be merely ad hoc.
The second problem is this: what does one mean by “amount of change”?
This is, admittedly, a vague description, but it is not clear how to make it
any less vague. The usual approach is this: one fixes a language, and then,
for each history, one fixes the set of truth-value changes (that is, the set
of ordered pairs consisting of a time and a primitive of the language which
changes truth-value at that time). Containment between these sets gives
a preference relation between histories: those histories are to be preferred
which have minimal sets of truth-value changes. One can give this procedure
a much more sophisticated and formal definition: it is generally known as
circumscription [16], and is widely used in the AI community.
The problem with this approach is that it is strongly language-dependent:
it is possible to have equivalent languages, with different primitives, which
give different preference relations according to this definition. One can, by
a suitable choice of primitives for the language, make the preference relation
come out any way that one wants [35]. In more technical language, the en-
tailment relations which circumscription yields are not preserved by uniform
substitution. Failure of uniform substitution is (pace Makinson [18]) a cause
of concern, for two reasons. Practically, it makes the use of these theories
rather problematic: there may well be some magical set of primitives which
make the predictions come out right, but one is given no guidance as to what
it might be. And, theoretically, this remains a worry: closure under uniform
substitution is motivated by a concern that mathematics should be more than
mere syntax, that is, that the entities which mathematics and logic describe
should be independent of our choice of the language – the “coordinate frame”,
as it were – which we use to describe them.
Now Lewis works with possible worlds, which, for him, are first class indi-
viduals, and his closeness relation between possible worlds – which corresponds
to our notion of minimising change – is simply given: he does not say how to
work it out, and, in particular, how to work it out on the basis of physically
realistic measurements. Consequently, he does not explicitly face the prob-
lems that we have described above. However, we should note that his account
may well be susceptible to similar problems: it may work in the abstract, but,
if we require that the nearness relations between worlds should be capable of
evaluation in terms of continuously differentiable functions of measurements
made in those worlds, we may end up with a theory incompatible with physics
[34]. Lewis’ approach turns out to be, in Fodor’s terms, global : we have to
know about all of the possible worlds that there are, and we have to know
these worlds directly as individuals, in order to make causal inferences.
The difficulty with Lewis’ account comes from a quite general result (specif-
ically, from what is known as Noether’s theorem) which has to do with the
invariance of the laws of physics under coordinate transformation. So, concep-
tually, these considerations are not infinitely far removed from the problems
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that circumscription has with invariance under uniform substitution: and the
problems with this approach seem to be quite deeply rooted.
It is, of course, not impossible that one could modify circumscription so
as to allay these worries, or, indeed, that Lewis’ account of counterfactuals
could be made specific enough to work with physical laws. However, these are
difficult problems, and they may well be better illuminated by an alternative
approach.
1.4 Explanation-Based Approaches Consider the bad history given in (3).
We might attempt a critique of it as follows: the problem is not that there
are too many changes, but that we cannot explain one of the facts – namely,
the falsity of loaded at time 1. All of the other facts in that history can be
explained, either because of the effects of actions or because they are facts
unchanged from the previous time; but not this one. So a good constraint to
put on our logic might be to require that every fact should be explained.
This approach might have a good deal to recommend it. A good notion of
explanation would, one thinks, be language-, or coordinate-frame-, indepen-
dent: the translation of an explanation would surely still be an explanation.
Furthermore, it has a pleasing directness: human beings like us perform a
lot of common sense causal explanation, and reflection on this process might
give us useful data for formalising such explanations. We might also cite the
philosophical tradition: since the time of Aristotle, at least, causality and
explanation have been very closely linked [1, p. 32], [7].
In order to carry this programme forward, we will have to have a certain
amount of technical apparatus. We will have to have a notion of explanation:
the things to be explained will be facts, and we should be able to express, of
any particular fact, whether it is explained or not. These notions should be
closed under uniform substitution: that is, the translation of an explanation
should be an explanation. Such an approach to reasoning about action is,
indeed, possible: it was formulated by McCain and Turner, and we will study
it in the remainder of this paper.
2 McCain and Turners’ System
Their treatment [21] of the frame problem goes as follows. Suppose that we
have a language L, which will have the connectives of the classical proposi-
tional calculus. McCain and Turner then consider a binary sentential opera-
tor: let us write it · ⊲ ·. Applications of this operator – of the form ϕ⊲ψ – are
called “causal rules”, and they can, in McCain and Turner’s treatment, be
regarded as purely metatheoretic assertions: they read them as ‘ϕ causes ψ’,
but we will argue for a reading of ‘ϕ explains ψ’. A collection of causal rules
will be called a causal theory. Given a causal theory Θ in our language L, we
define an operator (·)Θ, from models of L to sets of sentences, as follows:
MΘ = {ψ|ϕ ⊲ ψ ∈ D,M  ϕ}, (4)
where · is closure under entailment. We now say that a model M of L is
causally explained iff it is the only model of MΘ. And we say that a propo-
sition P is a consequence of Θ iff it is true in all of the Θ-causally explained
models of L.
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2.1 McCain and Turner’s Causal Rules We will give a simplified version of
McCain and Turner’s causal theory: in order to make our exposition more
direct, we will be presenting a version of our sequent calculus without the
quantifiers (we could describe a version with quantifiers, but it would add
extra technical complexity, and this extra complexity would not be germane
to the main argument of this paper).
Theories of this sort will talk of two sorts of entities, fluents and actions : a
fluent is something which can be true or false at a particular time, whereas an
action is something which can be performed (or not) at a particular time. We
represent each of these by a series of temporally indexed propositional atoms:
ft (t ∈ N) for each fluent (5)
at (t ∈ N) for each action (6)
Intuitively, ft is true iff f holds at time t, and at is true iff the action a occurs
at time t. The atoms ft will be called the fluent atoms : a fluent literal will
be a fluent atom or the negation of a fluent atom.
We now describe our causal theory. We assume that the effects of the ac-
tions can be formalised by giving, for each action a, a finite set of precondition-
postcondition pairs. Such a pair consists of a precondition and a postcondi-
tion, each of them a conjunction of fluent literals: the intuitive meaning of it
is that, if the precondition is true in a situation, then, after the execution of
the relevant action, the postcondition will be true in the successor situation.
For example, the precondition of the shoot action is the loaded fluent, and the
postcondition of the shoot action is ¬alive ∧ ¬loaded.
So, for each action a, and for each precondition-postcondition pair 〈f, g〉
belonging to that action, we add a series of causal rules:
(ft ∧ at) ⊲ gt+1 (7)
where f is the precondition of a, and g is the postcondition. We also have to
say which actions occur at which times: so, if action a occurs at time t0, we
add the causal rule
at0 ⊲ at0 (8)
We also need to deal with fluents that remain unchanged (see [29]): so, for
every fluent literal ft, we add the causal rule
ft ∧ ft+1 ⊲ ft+1 (9)
Finally, we assume that a set of fluents is given which describes the initial
situation: for each such fluent f , we add the causal rule
f0 ⊲ f0. (10)
Given these rules, this procedure appears to work: that is, it yields correct
solutions of the frame problem (the reader is invited to check that it works
with Example 1.1). As a bonus, it is fairly efficient computationally.
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2.2 The Road Ahead As it stands, though, McCain and Turner’s definitions
are not entirely perspicuous, either mathematically or conceptually. The defi-
nition of causally explained models is mysterious: we would, thus, like a more
illuminating treatment of the mathematics. Furthermore, it is difficult to ex-
plain the conceptual role of ⊲. For example, one of McCain and Turner’s rules
is f0 ⊲ f0 (10). But reading ⊲ as ‘causes’ here is simply implausible: proposi-
tions – or the states of affairs which they denote – are not usually thought of
as causing themselves.
So, we will do two things in this paper. Firstly, we will give an alternative
definition of (4): it can easily be reformulated as a relation between models,
and relations on a set of models give modal operators. So we can, instead,
define a suitable modal operator, @; given this operator, we can reformulate
the definition of MΘ (4) as
MΘ = {ϕ|M  @ϕ};
similarly, the relation
ϕ ⊢ @ψ
is equivalent to
ϕ ⊲ ψ
(equivalent in the sense that the two relations give the same set of “causally
closed” models).
But, as well as merely technical reformulations, we also want to say what
these constructionsmean. We argue, then, that a better reading of ϕ⊲ψ is that
‘ϕ explains ψ’ – and, correspondingly, @ψ can be regarded as a disjunction
of all of the possible explanations of ψ. In fact, this explanatory reading has
been anticipated: Lifschitz [17, p. 451] paraphrases ϕ⊲ψ as “[ψ] has a cause if
[ϕ] is true, or . . . [ϕ] provides a ‘causal explanation’ for [ψ]”. And, given this
explanatory reading, reflexive rules seem far less contentious: (4) simply says
that the proposition f0 “explains itself”. Self-explanation is a good deal less
problematic than self-causation, since explanations, after all, have to come to
an end (or, of course, loop) at some point – see, for example Wittgenstein
[37, §217]. In a similar way, McCain and Turner’s rule for persistence (9) can
be easily motivated in terms of explanation: a good explanation for a fluent
being true at t+1 is that it was true at t, and that its truth value is unchanged
between t and t+ 1. But it is hard to read this rule causally without, again,
invoking self-causation.
3 The Modal Logic
3.1 Motivation Our system is defined proof-theoretically, but it was arrived
at by reformulating McCain and Turner’s original definition: our aim was to
find a sequent calculus, with a good proof theory, which corresponded very
closely to their model-theoretic construction. We proceed by progressively
reformulating their work.
Remark 3.1 (Notation). We should explain a few notational conventions. ϕ
and ψ will always stand for, respectively, the antecedents and consequents of
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causal rules. General propositions will be written using lower case Roman
letters, p, q, r, . . .. Sets of propositions will be written with upper case Greek
letters, Γ,∆; Θ will be used for causal theories, i.e. sets of causal rules. Lan-
guages will be written L, with subscripts and superscripts. Models of our
various theories will be written M,M ′, . . . And when, in the appendix, we do
ordinal analysis we will use lower case Greek letters, but not ϕ or ψ.
3.1.1 Reformulation 1: Model Theory First a definition:
Definition 3.2. A causal theory Θ defines a relation RΘ on models of the
language L by
M RΘ M
′ ⇔ for every ϕ ⊲ ψ ∈ Θ,
if M  ϕ, then M ′  ψ
(11)
We then have:
Lemma 3.3. For any p ∈ L,
MΘ ⊢ p ⇔ M ′  p for all M ′ with M RΘ M
′ (12)
Proof Note first that, for any model M ′,
M ′  MΘ ⇔ for all ϕ ⊲ ψ ∈ Θ.M  ϕ⇒M ′  ψ,
so we have
MΘ ⊢ p ⇔ M ′  p for all M ′  MΘ
⇔ for all M ′ (for all ϕ ⊲ ψ ∈ ΘM  ϕ⇒M ′  ψ)
⇒M ′  p
⇔ for all M ′.M RΘ M
′ ⇒M ′  p

So we have
Corollary 3.4. For any model M , M is causally explained according to Θ iff
{M} = {M ′|M RΘ M
′}
3.1.2 Reformulation 2: Modal Models We can now reformulate McCain and
Turner’s theory in modal terms.
Definition 3.5. Given, as above, a language L and a causal theory Θ, define
a Kripke model KΘ as follows:
the language: is L@, generated by L together with the modal operator
@.
the frame: consists of the set M of models of the non-modal language
L, together with the accessibility relation RΘ.
the forcing relation: is given by the usual  relation between elements
of M and propositions of L, extended to modal formulae in the usual
way. If we wish to be pedantic (but we rarely will), we could call the
new forcing relation @.
Notice that we have:
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Proposition 3.6. For each causal law P ⊲ Q, the modal sentence
P → @Q (13)
is valid at each world of K.
Proof This follows directly from the definition of RΘ. 
Then we have:
Proposition 3.7. For M ∈ M, M is causally explained by Θ iff, as a world
of the Kripke model KΘ,
M  (@p→ p) ∧ (p→ @p) (14)
for any p.
Proof This is a standard modal reformulation of the condition
{M} = {M ′|M RΘ M
′};
see, for example, van Benthem [32]. 
This result is pretty rather than useful: it refers to a particular Kripke model,
and models are hard to present in any effective sense.
We can make progress, though, by asking how other Kripke models are
related to KΘ.
Definition 3.8. Let K be any other Kripke model of L@ such that, for any
ϕ ⊲ ψ ∈ Θ, and any world w of K,
w  ϕ→ @ψ.
Then define a map
η : worlds ofK → worlds ofKΘ
by sending a world w of K to
{p | p ∈ L, w  p} (15)
Note that the sets of propositions defined by (15) are, by the properties of
Kripke models, models of L: consequently, these sets of propositions are, in
fact, worlds of KΘ.
Proposition 3.9. For w,w′ worlds of K, if wRKw
′, then η(w)RΘη(w
′).
Proof Suppose that ϕ ⊲ ψ ∈ Θ, and that η(w)  ϕ. Then, by definition of
η, w  ϕ. However, by the assumption on K, w  ϕ → @ψ: since wRKw
′,
we have w′  ψ, and so, by the definition of η, η(w′)  ψ. This is so for any
ϕ ⊲ ψ ∈ Θ, and thus we have η(w)RΘη(w
′). 
Proposition 3.10. For any world w of K, and any non-modal proposition p,
if η(w)  @p, then w  @p.
Proof Immediate from the above. 
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This gives us an intuition as to what characterises the model KΘ: among all
of the models which globally satisfy (13), it is the one in which @ is strongest
(or, alternatively, the one in which the relation R is the largest). This shows
us how to find a sequent calculus which corresponds to the model KΘ, and
which, consequently, represents the McCain-Turner procedure.
There is a standard way of getting such a sequent calculus (see, for example,
Hallna¨s and Schroeder-Heister [9, 10]). We first give ourselves right rules for
@ corresponding to the constraints which @ must satisfy: then we find left
rules which invert the right rules. The constraints which @ must satisfy are
quite simple: ϕ→ @ψ must be a theorem, for every ϕ ⊲ ψ ∈ Θ. Rather more
generally, if we have causal rules {ϕi ⊲ψi}i∈I , and if we have {ψi}i∈I ⊢ p, then
we must have {ϕi}i∈I ⊢ @p: this gives us a right rule for @ which ensures that
@ is a K modality. The left rule will, correspondingly, invert this right rule:
and we get the rules for @ in Table 1. And, as the remainder of this paper will
show, our system does, indeed, give a sequent calculus for the McCain-Turner
procedure. It allows us to recover the Kripke model KΘ, which turns out to
be the canonical model of our modal logic.
3.2 The System Our system will be given by a sequent calculus, as in
White [36]; it is given by the rules in Table 1, whose formulation depends on
an underlying set of causal rules. As explained above, we will, for the sake of
simplicity, present the propositional version of this system: we could present
a first-order system, but at the price of extra technical complexity.
We should note that this sequent calculus introduces a new language, L@ –
an extension of L by the modal operator @ – and a new consequence relation,
⊢@. Our cut elimination theorem will show that L@ is a definitional extension
of L, and that ⊢ is the restriction of ⊢@ to L: but, for the moment, we will be
careful to respect the differences between the two entailment relations.
Remark 3.11. The following considerations may make the calculus, and the
connection between L@ and L, more perspicuous. If we were to assume that
L has arbitrary disjunctions, our cut elimination result would show that we
could write
@p =
∨
ψ1,...,ψk⊢@p
ϕi ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk
In this case, the left and right rules for @ would simply be the left and right
rules for a disjunction
∨
i∈I Pi, namely
{Γ, pi ⊢@ ∆}i∈I ∨
L
Γ,
∨
i∈I
pi ⊢@ ∆ and
Γ ⊢@ pi,∆ (i ∈ I) ∨
R
Γ ⊢@
∨
i∈I
pi (16)
This explains the form of the side conditions ψ1, . . . , ψk ⊢@ p in the left and
right rules for @X : they take the place of i ∈ I in the left and right rules for∨
i∈I . Just as in those latter left and right rules, the conditions ψ1, . . . , ψk ⊢@ p
occur positively in both left and right rules: they are side conditions and not
premises.
Remark 3.12. We should remark that the rules for @ are, in general, infini-
tary (and even when finite, the set of premises of @L can well be undecid-
able). The qualification “in general” is important here: cut elimination will
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Table 1 Sequent Calculus Rules
Ax
p ⊢@ p
⊥ L
⊥⊢@
⊤R
⊢@ ⊤
Γ ⊢@ ∆
LW
Γ, p ⊢@ ∆
Γ ⊢@ ∆
RW
Γ ⊢@ p,∆
Γ, p, p ⊢@ ∆
LC
Γ, p ⊢@ ∆
Γ ⊢@ p, p,∆
RC
Γ ⊢@ p,∆
Γ ⊢@ p,∆
¬L
Γ,¬p ⊢@ ∆
Γ, p ⊢@ ∆
¬R
Γ ⊢@ ¬p,∆
Γ, p, q ⊢@ ∆
∧L
Γ, p ∧ q ⊢@ ∆
Γ ⊢@ p,∆ Γ ⊢@ q,∆
∧R
Γ ⊢@ p ∧ q,∆
Γ, p ⊢@ ∆ Γ, q ⊢@ ∆
∨L
Γ, p ∨ p ⊢@ ∆
Γ ⊢@ p, q,∆
∨R
Γ ⊢@ p ∨ q,∆
Γ ⊢@ p,∆ Γ, q ⊢@ ∆
→ L
Γ, p→ q ⊢@ ∆
Γ, p ⊢@ q,∆
→ R
Γ ⊢@ p→ q,∆
Γ ⊢@ ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk,∆ ψ1, . . . , ψk ⊢@ p
@R
Γ ⊢@ @p,∆{
Γ, {ϕi}i∈Ij ⊢@ ∆, {ψi}i∈Ij ⊢@ p
}
j∈J
@L
Γ,@p ⊢@ ∆
Γ ⊢@ p
m,∆ Γ′, pn ⊢@ ∆
′
multicut
Γ,Γ′ ⊢@ ∆,∆
′
conditions on the rules:
@R where, for all i, ϕi ⊲ ψi is a causal rule.
@L for each appropriate i, we have a causal rule ϕi ⊲ ψi, and
where the {ϕi ⊲ψi}i∈Ij are the only such finite sets of ϕs and
ψs, such that {ψi}i∈Ij ⊢@ p, that there are (J need not be
finite).
multicut pn stands for n occurrences of p; m,n > 0
show that, for typical applications, this rule very often has a finite, decidable
(and, indeed, very tractable) set of premises. Indeed, many applications – for
example, that described in Appendix B – will only use the right rule for @,
which is much more tractable. Furthermore, even when the rules are actually
infinitary, the system is still very useful for metatheoretical purposes: after all,
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the proof-theoretic use of infinitary systems has a very long and respectable
history (see, for example, Fairtlough and Wainer [6, p. 164]).
Example 3.13. Here is an example of how the left rule might plausibly be
used. Michael Scriven [28, p. 61] describes the following argument pattern:
we know that event p occurred. We know that the causes of p are a, b, or c:
but we also know that neither a nor b occurred. So we conclude c.
In our system, this would go as follows. We have p, and we are supposing
the world to be explanatorily closed, so we can conclude @p (here we are
doing causal explanation, so our explanations really are causes). We can also
conclude that
@p ∼= a ∨ b ∨ c;
we also have ¬b and ¬c, so we conclude a.
4 Consequences of Cut Elimination
The proof of cut elimination is technical (it relies on ordinal induction), and is
given in the appendix. It has important consequences, however, and we give
some of them here.
Corollary 4.1. The modal theory is a conservative extension of the non-modal
theory: that is, if Γ and ∆ are non-modal, we have
Γ ⊢ ∆ iff Γ ⊢@ ∆.
Proof Any proof of Γ ⊢ ∆ is a proof of Γ ⊢@ ∆; however, any cut free proof
of Γ ⊢@ ∆ cannot involve the modal rules, and is thus a proof of Γ ⊢ ∆. 
So, from now on we can safely ignore the distinction between ⊢ and ⊢@.
4.1 Semantics We can now prove a soundness and completeness theorem
for our logic. We do this as follows: we first identify our model KΘ of Defini-
tion 3.5 as the canonical model of this modal logic. That is, semantic validity
in this single model will entail syntactic validity. We can, then, prove sound-
ness by showing that any syntactically valid sequent is also semantically valid
when interpreted in the canonical model, and prove completeness by show-
ing the converse. Recall that KΘ has, as worlds, models of the non-modal
language L, and that the accessibility relation is given by the relation RΘ of
Definition 3.2. The corresponding modelling relation between worlds of KΘ
and sentences of L@ will, as in Definition 3.5, be written @.
For convenience of notation, we identify models of L with the sets of non-
modal sentences true in them, and these are just the maximal ⊢-consistent
sets of nonmodal sentences: let M be the set of all such models. Clearly, for
A nonmodal and M ∈M, we have
M  a iff a ∈M iff M ⊢ a.
For this section, letters a, a′, . . . will range over nonmodal sentences, whereas
p, p′, . . . will range over the whole of L@.
The proof of the following is immediate:
Lemma 4.2. For any M and any non-modal a, M @ a iff M  a.
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We now define a semantic entailment relation, @: this will be like the usual
notion of modal semantic entailment, but with respect to the single model
KΘ. As we have explained, KΘ will turn out to be the canonical model of our
logic, so the restriction to KΘ is harmless.
We first define semantic values for sentences in L@.
Definition 4.3. For sentences p in L@, define their semantic values JpK ⊆M
as follows:
JaK = {M |M  a} for a a nonmodal atom
J¬pK = M− JpK
Jp ∧ qK = JpK ∩ JqK
Jp ∨ qK = JpK ∪ JqK
J@pK = {M |∀M ′.M RΘ M
′ ⇒M ′ ∈ JqK}
The following lemma is immediate:
Lemma 4.4. For a nonmodal, JaK = {M ∈M|M  a}
Definition 4.5. For Γ,∆ ⊆ L@, we say that
Γ @ ∆ iff
⋂
p∈Γ
JpK ⊆
⋃
q∈∆
JqK.
We also need to generalise our operation (·)Θ of (4) so that it can be applied to
general subsets, rather than simply models, of L. We recall that, for M ∈M,
MΘ
def
= {ψ|M  ϕ for some ϕ ⊲ ψ}.
Definition 4.6. Let S ⊆ L: define
SΘ
def
= {a ∈ L | S ⊢ ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕk for rules ϕi ⊲ ψi, with ψi ⊢ a for all i}
Note that, if S is a model, the new definition coincides with the old one. We
need the disjunction of ϕs in order to prove the following lemma, which will
be crucial:
Lemma 4.7. If {Si}i∈I is a set of subsets of L, with each Si closed under
entailment, we have ⋂
i∈I
(SΘi ) =
(⋂
i∈I
Si
)Θ
Proof The right to left containment is trivial. For the left to right contain-
ment, suppose that a ∈ SΘi for all i. Thus, for all i, we have
Si ⊢ ϕi1 , . . . , ϕiki with ψij ⊢ a for all j.
Then, since the Si are closed under entailment, we have⋂
i∈I
Si ⊢
⋃
i∈I
{ϕi1 , . . . , ϕiki }.
But, by the compactness of L, we can find a finite set of {ϕi ⊲ ψi} with⋂
i∈I
Si ⊢ ϕ1, . . . , ϕn with ψi ⊢ a for all i,
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and this establishes the result. 
We now prove soundness and completeness.
Lemma 4.8. The KΘ semantics is sound and complete for inferences of the
form S ⊢@ @p, for Γ ⊆ L and p ∈ L@: that is,
Γ ⊢@ p iff Γ @ p.
Proof We prove this by induction on the complexity of p: for p nonmodal,
it is, by Corollary 4.1, simply soundness and completeness for the predicate
calculus. The inductive steps for the nonmodal connectives are quite standard:
there remains the case when p = @q. It will suffice to show that
J@qK =
⋃
i
Jϕi,1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕi,kiK
where, in the usual way, ϕi,j ⊲ψi,j for all relevant i, j, where ψi,1, . . . , ψi,ki ⊢@ q
for all i, and where these are all of such finite sets of causal laws that there
are; the right to left inference gives soundness, and the left to right inference
gives completeness. Note that the semantic values of @q, for any q, are a
union of the semantic values of nonmodals, and so
J@qK =
⋃
JaK⊆J@qK
JaK
Now, if a is nonmodal,
JaK ⊆ J@qK
iff ∀M.M  a.∀M ′.M ′  MΘ ⇒ M ′ @ q
expanding the definitions of J@qK and of RΘ
iff ∀M ′.(∃M  q.M ′  MΘ) ⇒ M ′ @ q
iff ∀M ′.M ′ 
(
{A}
)Θ
⇒ M ′ @ q
(where {a} is the deductive closure of a) by Lemma 4.7
iff
(
{a}
)Θ
@ q
by the inductive hypothesis. Now expansion of the definitions shows that⋃
({a})
Θ
@Q
JaK =
⋃
i
Jϕi,1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕi,kiK
(with the usual restrictions on the ϕi,j), which was to be proved. 
Recall now that the forcing relation, @, on the Kripke model is defined
inductively using the structure of KΘ. We can now show that, in fact, it is
the same as provability.
Corollary 4.9. For a model M ∈M and p ∈ L@,
M @ p iff M ⊢@ p.
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Proof By soundness and completeness,
M ⊢@ p iff JMK ⊆ JpK;
but JMK = {M}, so
M ⊢@ p iff M ∈ JpK
iff M @ p
by definition of @ 
Theorem 4.10. The KΘ semantics is sound for general sequents.
Proof We prove this by induction over the length of a proof: the nonmodal
rules are straightforward, and we use Lemma 4.8 for the modal rules. 
Lemma 4.11. For any p ∈ L@, and for any M ∈ M, either M ⊢@ p or
M ⊢@ ¬p.
Proof We prove this by induction: since ⊢@ coincides with ⊢ on L, and since
M is a model of L, the result is clearly true if p is nonmodal. The crucial step
is to prove the result for propositions of the form @q: here we argue as follows
Suppose M 6⊢@ ¬ @ q
then M,@q 6⊢@ ⊥
and, by the left rule for @, this holds iff, for some set of causal rules I,
M, {ϕi}i∈I 6⊢@ ⊥
which, since M is a model of L, in turn holds iff, for any i ∈ I,
M ⊢@ ϕi
and so, by the right rule for @,
M ⊢@ @q
By cut elimination, no element of L@ can be both entailed and not entailed
by M . 
Corollary 4.12. The maximal ⊢@-consistent subsets of L@ are in one-to-one
correspondence with the maximal ⊢-consistent subsets of L (i.e. the elements
of M).
Proof Intersection with L gives a morphism in one direction: Lemma 4.11
shows that every maximal ⊢-consistent subset of L can be uniquely extended
to a maximal ⊢@-consistent subset of L@. 
Theorem 4.13. The KΘ semantics is complete.
Proof It suffices to show that, if Γ ⊆ L@, and if Γ 6⊢@⊥, then JΓK is not empty,
i.e. that there is some world M of KΘ with M ∈ JΓK. But, if we have Γ 6⊢@⊥,
we can extend Γ to a maximal ⊢@-consistent subset of L@: this will correspond
to an element M of M. By Corollary 4.9, this is the world we want. 
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4.1.1 Interpolation and Finiteness We first prove the following interpolation
theorem.
Proposition 4.14 (Interpolation). If we have Γ ⊢@ @p,∆, for some p and
Γ,∆ ⊆ L@, then there is a set ∆0 ⊆ L such that
Γ ⊢@ ∆0,∆
and, for each a ∈ ∆0, there is some b ∈ L such that
a ⊢@ @b and
b ⊢@ p.
Proof We prove this by a straightforward induction over a cut free proof:
because we might use the contraction rule on @p, the inductive hypothesis
will be the same as that of the theorem but with the slightly weaker condition
that Γ ⊢@ (@p)
n,∆. The elements a of ∆0 will turn out to be finite conjunctions
of rule bodies, whereas the bs will be the corresponding conjunctions of rule
heads. 
One of the key applications of our cut elimination theorem is in proving finite-
ness results, such as the following: it is applicable to the modal implications
that we will use in the next section for interpreting Parsons and Jennings’
logic of argument, so it is quite significant.
Corollary 4.15. If
Γ ⊢ @p
is provable in the sequent calculus, with Γ a set of nonmodals, then there is a
finite set Γ′ ⊆ Γ, and nonmodal propositions A and B, such that
Γ′ ⊢ a,
a ⊢@ @b, and
b ⊢@ p.
Proof We apply Theorem 4.14, which gets us a possibly infinite set ∆ with
Γ ⊢@ ∆. But, in this case, Γ and ∆ are both classical, so we can apply
Corollary 4.1 to show that Γ ⊢ ∆. We can now apply compactness to find a
finite ∆0 ⊆ ∆, and, taking disjunctions, we get a single a and b. 
5 Explanation and Argument
As we have argued, McCain and Turner’s theory seems to be a very natural
formulation of explanation in general : although its original application may
have been to a causal context, there is nothing about it which forces these
explanations to be causal. Once we broaden our horizons to general explana-
tion, we can bring this modal system into contact with other work: we give
one example of this, the theory of Parsons and Jennings [23] (see also Parsons
et al. [24]). We could give other applications: for example, where we have
explanations, questions must also be in the neighbourhood, and thus we can
also express a good deal of the formalism of Belnap and Steel [2] (see Harrah
[11]) in terms of ours.
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5.1 The Parsons and Jennings System Parsons and Jennings ([23]; see also
[24]) have described a consequence relation, ⊢ACR, which is intended to cap-
ture the practice of argumentation. The items which this system manipulates
are ordered pairs (p,Γ), where p is a proposition and A a set of propositions:
we will call such a pair an argument. Intuitively, p is the conclusion of an
argument, and Γ is the set of its grounds. We will also call p the head of the
argument, and Γ its body.
The system is given in Table 2: here Θ is a set of basic arguments, and it
plays exactly the same role in their system as a causal theory does in McCain
and Turner’s. Parsons and Jennings write their system in natural deduction
style, with introduction and elimination rules, using sequents of the form
Θ ⊢ACR (p,A): such a sequent says that A is an argument for p, given basic
arguments Θ.
(Note that we have interchanged the labels on the rules ¬I and RAA:
Parsons and Jennings’ original labelling is clearly a typo of some sort.)
Table 2 The Parsons and Jennings System
(p,Γ) ∈ Θ
Axiom
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ)
⊤I
Θ ⊢ACR (⊤,∅)
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ) Θ ⊢ACR (q,Γ
′)
∧I
Θ ⊢ACR (p ∧ q,Γ ∪ Γ
′)
Θ ⊢ACR (p ∧ q,Γ)
∧E1
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ)
Θ ⊢ACR (p ∧ q,Γ)
∧E2
Θ ⊢ACR (q,Γ)
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ)
∨I1
Θ ⊢ACR (p ∨ q,Γ)
Θ ⊢ACR (q,Γ)
∨I2
Θ ⊢ACR (p ∨ q,Γ)
Θ ⊢ACR (p ∨ q,Γ)
Θ, (p,Γ) ⊢ACR (r,Γ
′)
Θ, (q,Γ) ⊢ACR (r,Γ
′′)
∨E
Θ ⊢ACR (r,Γ
′ ∪ Γ′′)
Θ, (p,∅) ⊢ACR (⊥,Γ)
¬I
Θ ⊢ACR (¬p,Γ)
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ) Θ ⊢ACR (¬p,Γ)
¬E
Θ ⊢ACR (⊥,Γ)
Θ, (p,∅) ⊢ACR (q,Γ)
→ I
Θ ⊢ACR (p→ q,Γ)
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ) Θ ⊢ACR (p→ q,Γ)
→ E
Θ ⊢ACR (q,Γ ∪∆)
Θ ⊢ACR (⊥,Γ)
EFQ
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ)
Θ, (¬p,∅) ⊢ACR (⊥,Γ)
RAA
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ)
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5.2 Comparison with Our System We can now translate Parsons and Jen-
nings’ system into ours.
Definition 5.1. Let Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ) be a sequent in Parsons and Jennings’
system. Its modal translation is the sequent
Γ ⊢ @ΘP,
where @Θ is the modal operator defined by causal laws


∧
q∈Γ
q

 ⊲ p ∣∣ (p,Γ) ∈ Θ

 .
Since the Parsons and Jennings system is written in natural deduction style,
some of the rules (for example → I) manipulate the set of basic arguments:
consequently, the modal operator in the modal translation will vary. We will,
then, need the following lemma:
Lemma 5.2. If @ is the modality associated to a set Θ of explanations, and
if @′ is that associated to Θ ∪ {(ψ, ϕ)}, then define an interpretation
α : L@′ → L@
by
α(p) = p for p atomic
α(p ∧ p′) = α(p) ∧ α(p′)
α(p ∨ p′) = α(p) ∨ α(p′)
α(¬p) = ¬α(p)
α(@′p) = (ϕ ∧ @(ψ → α(p))) ∨ @α(p)
for any p. Then, for any Γ,∆ ⊆ L@′
Γ ⊢@′ ∆ iff α(Γ) ⊢@ α(∆)
Proof We check that Γ and α(Γ) have the same semantic values (regarded
as subsets of M), and similarly for ∆; we then apply the soundness and
completeness theorems. 
We have the following
Proposition 5.3. The modal interpretation is sound: that is, each of Parsons
and Jennings’ axioms is translated into a tautology.
Proof
Ax: is
(p,Γ) ∈ Θ
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ)
and this follows from our definition of the modal translation.
∧–I, ¬–E, →–E: ∧ − I, for example, is
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ) Θ ⊢ACR (q,Γ
′)
Θ ⊢ACR (p ∧ q,Γ ∪ Γ
′)
and this follows from the K tautology @p ∧ @q ⊢ @p ∧ q. ¬ − E and
→ −E are similar.
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∧–E1, ∧–E2, ∨–I1, ∨–I2, EFQ: ∧ − E1, for example, is
Θ ⊢ACR (p ∧ q,Γ)
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ)
and this follows from the K tautology ⊢ @(a∧ b)→ @a. ∧−E2, ∨− I1,
∨I2, and EFQ are similar.
⊤–I: This is just
⊢ @⊤,
a K tautology.
∨–E: This is
Θ ⊢ACR (p ∨ q,Γ) Θ, (p,Γ) ⊢ACR (r,Γ
′) Θ, (q,Γ) ⊢ACR (r,Γ
′′)
Θ ⊢ACR (r,Γ
′ ∪ Γ′′)
and this corresponds, in our system, to
a→ @Θ(p ∨ q), b→ @Θ∪{(p,Γ)}r, c→ @Θ∪{(q,Γ)}r
⊢ b ∧ c→ @Θr
We can use the lemma to express @Θ∪{(p,Γ)} and @Θ∪{(q,Γ)} in terms
of @Θ; some routine but tedious computation then reduces this case to
@Θ (p ∨ q),@Θ(p→ r),@Θ(q → r) ⊢ @Θr (17)
which is a K tautology.
RAA, ¬–I: ¬–I is
Θ, (p,∅) ⊢ACR (⊥, A)
Θ ⊢ACR (¬p,A)
which corresponds to
A→ @Θ∪{(p,∅)} ⊥⊢ A→ @Θ¬p;
using the lemma on @Θ∪{(p,∅)}, and some computation, reduces this to
@ ⊥ ∨ @ (p→⊥) ⊢ @¬p
which is a K tautology. ¬–I is similar.
→–I: This is
Θ, (p,∅) ⊢ACR (q, A)
Θ ⊢ACR (p→ q, A)
which corresponds to
A→ @Θ∪{(p,∅)}q ⊢ A→ @Θ(p→ q).
The usual moves reduce this to
@q ∨ @(p→ q) ⊢ @(p→ q)
again a K tautology.

Completeness does not hold. This is for trivial reasons: all rules (except ∨E)
of the Parsons and Jennings system leave the body of the argument intact. A
trivial induction on the length of proofs will yield
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Proposition 5.4. In any proof of
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ),
A must be a union of the bodies of rules in Θ.
Since the modal sequent calculus certainly does not satisfy this condition, we
cannot hope for completeness. What we need to do is to be able to compose
proofs in the Parsons and Jennings system with natural deduction proofs for
the grounds of an argument: we could, theoretically, write down another set
of rules for doing this. However, we only need one extra rule, which is this:
Definition 5.5. Let classical ∨E be the following rule:
Γ ⊢ q ∨ r Θ ⊢ACR (r,Γ
′ ∪ {q}) Θ ⊢ACR (r,Γ
′′ ∪ {r})
∨EC
Θ ⊢ACR (r,Γ ∪ Γ
′ ∪ Γ′′)
where A ⊢ q ∨ r is an entailment in classical natural deduction.
We clearly have
Proposition 5.6. The modal translation is sound for classical or-elimination.
And we can also prove completeness:
Theorem 5.7. The modal translation is complete: that is, given a proof of
Γ ⊢ @Θp, (18)
there is a proof, in the Parsons and Jennings system together with classical
or-elimination, of
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ) (19)
Sketch of proof We establish the following lemma:
Lemma 5.8. If p is non-modal, given a sequent calculus proof of
ψ1, . . . , ψk ⊢ p,
then there is a Parsons and Jennings proof of
Θ ⊢ (p, {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk}).
This lemma can be proved by first transforming the sequent calculus proof to
a natural deduction proof, and then observing that the Parsons and Jennings
rules mirror the rules of classical natural deduction.
So now we can prove the theorem: we take a proof of A ⊢ @Θp, and from
it derive a finite set I such that
Γ ⊢
∨
i∈I
ϕi1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕiki (20)
Θ ⊢ACR (p, {ϕi1 , . . . , ϕiki }) for any i (21)
We then use classical or-elimination in order to glue together (20) and (21).

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Remark 5.9. As we see here, the natural deduction formulation is actually
quite ambiguous as to what its premises are: in a proof of
Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ),
are the premises the basic arguments Θ, or the grounds Γ for the argument
which is to be established? Now the system is set up as if the premises are the
set Θ of basic arguments, and this gives a sense of composition of arguments
which is valid: that is, from Θ ⊢ACR (p,Γ) and Θ
′, (p,Γ) ⊢ACR (q,Γ
′), we can
establish Θ′,Θ ⊢ACR (q,Γ
′). But this is not enough: we also want to regard
the grounds of arguments as premises.
The situation is clearly two-dimensional in something like Pratt’s sense –
he defines the dimension of a logic to be “the smallest number of variables
and constants of the logic sufficient to determine the remaining variables and
constants” Pratt [26]: the modal operator can be varied quite independently
of the classical connectives, merely by altering the set of causal rules. Con-
sequently, a formalism such as Masini’s Masini [19] Masini [20] may well be
more appropriate.
Remark 5.10. This translation between sequent calculus and the Parsons
and Jennings natural deduction is, in addition, not very sensitive to the
structure of proofs on either side: natural deduction proofs tend to trans-
form the conclusion of the argument quite extensively before coming down to
basic arguments. Sequent calculus proofs, by contrast, leave the conclusion
unchanged until an application of @R, after which the proof is a matter of
standard classical logic. In addition, the Parsons and Jennings system only
represents a fragment of the full sequent calculus (namely, the entailments in
which @ only occurs on the right). A natural deduction formulation of the
entire sequent calculus would be interesting, but would have to extend the
Parsons and Jennings system quite considerably.
6 Conclusion: Two Approaches to Nonmonotonic Reasoning
There are two approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning: there is the generally
accepted one, which may well be susceptible to Fodor’s critique. It can be
summarised in Brewka’s words:
To formalise human commonsense reasoning something different
[from classical logic] is needed. Commonsense reasoning is frequently
not monotonic. In many situations we draw conclusions which are
given up in the light of further information. [4, p. 2]
According to this view, nonmonotonic logic is applicable globally: it applies
to all of our commonsense reasoning. There is, so to speak, a small frag-
ment of our reasoning which happens to be monotonic: but commonsense is
nonmonotonic by default. There would, then, be a large amount of reason-
ing which was both nonmonotonic and global. This, if true, would be fairly
catastrophic. There has been quite a lot of recent success in implementing
nonmonotonic logic, but it is still true that, precisely because of this globality,
performance scales quite badly [5]. So, if we are supposed to do it on a very
large scale, it cannot be expected to perform well.
Contrast this with the McCain-Turner system. There are two aspects that
we need to examine: firstly, reasoning within the system itself, and, secondly,
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the relation between the set of causal rules and the modal operator. The
system itself is monotonic. It is a modal logic of a fairly well-known sort, and
it has a sequent calculus which admits cut elimination; we can, then, search for
proofs efficiently. The dependence of the modal operator on the set of rules
ϕ ⊲ ψ is, however, non-monotonic: if we add new rules, thus changing the
modal operator, then we may invalidate modal inferences that we previously
made. However, only the left rule for @ is thus sensitive; the right rule is not.
Consequently, although our system is nonmonotonic, it is so in a quite limited
way: it is not susceptible to the sort of “anything might entail anything else”
worries that Fodor has.
There is a final remark to be made. Many of the tractability results for
our system do not follow directly from its definition, but are established on
the basis of metatheory, and quite technical metatheory at that. Now this
would, perhaps, be a fatal objection if we were supposed to adopt this system
by means of introspection. However, if we are supposed to acquire styles of
reasoning on the basis of natural selection – in the manner of the cognitive
science described in [8, ch. 5] – then none of this matters: the metatheoretical
results apply to the system, and give it the evolutionary advantages that it
arguably has, regardless of whether or not the early primates who, maybe,
adopted these styles of reasoning were, or were not, familiar with technical
results in proof theory.
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In the appendix, we have material that does not fit naturally into the
argumentative structure of the main paper: the cut elimination, which is too
technical, and some material on Turner’s logic of universal causation, which
relates what we have done to previous work.
Appendix A Cut Elimination
We now prove our cut elimination result. This needs a certain amount of
machinery, because our system is, in generally, infinitary: proof trees may,
therefore, be infinitely branching, and – since we cannot apply Zorn’s lemma
– there may be branches of infinite length above a given node. Because of this,
we cannot assign a finite depth to each node, and, consequently, we cannot
prove cut elimination in the usual manner, that is, by an induction on both
the depth and the complexity of the cut formula. We can use an induction,
but it must be an induction over ordinals: there is a machinery of ordinal
analysis, which is used for the proof-theoretic analysis of infinitary systems (for
example, arithmetic with the ω-rule). We will generally follow the treatment
in Pohlers [25], with the modifications necessary because our system is two-
sided, not one-sided, and because our sole infinitary connective is @ rather
than the infinite conjunctions and disjunctions which Pohlers investigates.
Our case, in fact, is rather simple, because, if we regard @ as a possibly
infinite disjunction of finite conjuncts of non-modal formulae, the complexity
of the disjuncts is bounded a priori by ω.
In this section, since we want to treat entailments uniformly, we will write
rule applications as follows:
{Γi ⊢@ ∆i}i∈I
Γ ⊢@ ∆
where I can have zero, one, or two members (for the standard rules) or an
arbitrary number (for @L).
We first define the rank of a formula:
Definition A.1. If F ∈ L@, let its rank rk(F ) be the ordinal defined induc-
tively as follows:
1. rk(F ) = 0 if F is atomic,
2. rk(¬F ) = rk(∀x.F ) = rk(∃x.F ) = rk(F ) + 1
3. rk(F1 ∧ F2) = rk(F1 ∨ F2) = rk(F1 → F1) = max(rk(F1), rk(F2)) + 1
4. rk(@F ) = 0.
Note that rk(@F ) is independent of F : this is because, as we have remarked,
we can give an a priori bound on the disjuncts that @F can be thought of as
expanding into. We have
Proposition A.2. For any F ∈ L@, rk(F ) < ω.
Proof Immediate. 
We define the following classification of inference rules:
Definition A.3. The finitary rules will be all of the rules apart from @L. The
non-cut rules will be all of the rules except cut.
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Next, we define entailment symbols annotated with both the rank of cutfor-
mulae and the depth of the proof tree. There are two classes of inference rules:
the finitary rules, and @L. @L is the only infinitary rule; our proof trees, then,
will consist of portions where finitary rules are applied, separated by applica-
tions of @L. We will treat the two kinds of rule application differently, and
we will, therefore, use two ordinals for measuring the depth of the tree. ζ will
measure the number of applications of @L above the root of the tree which
have proofs involving cuts above them: it will, in general, be infinite. α will
measure the number of finitary rule applications above the root of the tree,
but will be reset to zero after each application of @L: it will be finite. ρ will
measure the rank of cut formulae, and will likewise be reset to zero after any
application of @L: it will, therefore, be finite. The last two rules will make
the annotations fit smoothly with our inductive arguments, which will first
over ζ, then over ρ, then over α.
Definition A.4. Define the entailment relations ⊢
α, ζ
ρ as follows:
1. If Γ ⊢@ ∆ is an instance of Ax, of ⊥ L, or of ⊤R, then
Γ ⊢
0, 0
0 ∆
2. If we have an instance of a finite non-cut inference rule
{Γi ⊢@ ∆i}i∈I
Γ ⊢@ ∆
and if, for all i ∈ I, Γi ⊢
αi, ζ
ρ ∆i where, for all i, αi < α, then
Γ ⊢
α, ζ
ρ ∆.
3. If
{Γi ⊢@ ∆i}i∈I
Γ ⊢@ ∆
is an instance of @L, and if, for all i, Γi ⊢
αi, 0
0 ∆i where ζi < ζ, then
Γ ⊢
0, 0
0 ∆.
4. If
{Γi ⊢@ ∆i}i∈I
Γ ⊢@ ∆
is an instance of @L, and if, for all i, Γi ⊢
αi, ζi
ρi
∆i where either some
ζi > 0 or some ρi > 0 and where ζi < ζ for all i, then
Γ ⊢
0, ζ
0 ∆.
5. If
Γ ⊢
α1, ζ
ρ A,∆ and Γ
′, A ⊢
α2, ζ
ρ ∆
′
with α1, α2 < α and rk(A) < ρ, then
Γ,Γ′ ⊢
α, ζ
ρ ∆,∆
′.
6. If Γ ⊢
α, ζ
ρ ∆, and if α ≤ β, ρ ≤ σ with β and σ finite, then
Γ ⊢
β, ζ
σ ∆
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7. If Γ ⊢
α, ζ
ρ ∆, and if ζ < η, then, for any finite β and σ,
Γ ⊢
β, η
σ ∆
.
The following lemmas follow by a trivial induction:
Lemma A.5. If Γ ⊢@ ∆, then, for some finite α and ρ, and some ordinal ζ,
Γ ⊢
α, ζ
ρ ∆.
Lemma A.6. A proof Γ ⊢@ ∆ is cut free iff it has an annotation of the form
Γ ⊢
α, 0
0 ∆.
Theorem A.7. Given a McCain-Turner causal theory, the corresponding
modal system satisfies cut elimination.
We prove this by the following lemmas: they are very much the same as the
corresponding lemmas in [25, pp. 60ff.]. Note that α#β stands for the so-
called natural sum of the ordinals α and β ([25, p. 43]): the relevant facts
that we shall use are that it is defined for any pair of ordinals α and β, and
that it is strictly monotonic in both arguments.
Lemma A.8. If
Γ ⊢
α, ζ
ρ X,∆ and Γ
′, X ⊢
β, η
ρ ∆
′
and if rk(X) = ρ, then
Γ,Γ′ ⊢
α+β, ζ#η
ρ ∆,∆
′
Proof We prove this by induction, first on ζ#η, then on α + β. There are
four cases.
1. One of the premises is an axiom, ⊥ L, or ⊤R, and X is not principal in
it: in this case, Γ,Γ′ ⊢@ ∆,∆
′ is an instance of the the same rule, and,
by the definition of Γ,Γ′ ⊢
α+β, ζ#η
ρ ∆,∆
′, we have the first case of the
result.
2. X is non-principal in one or the other of the premises (suppose wlog
the left one), and that premise is the conclusion of a finitary rule. Then
the prooftree on the left looks like

Πi
·
·
·
Γi ⊢
αi, ζ
ρ X,∆i


i∈I
Γ ⊢
α, ζ
ρ X,∆
Since, for all i, αi < α (and, consequently, αi + β < α + β), we can
assume the hypothesis inductively for cuts between Γi ⊢
αi, ζ1
ρ X,∆i and
Γ′, X ⊢
β, ζ2
ρ ∆
′, obtaining proofs Πi: we complete the proof as follows:

Π˜i
·
·
·
Γi,Γ
′ ⊢
αi+β, ζ#η
ρ ∆i,∆
′


i∈I
Γ,Γ′ ⊢
α+β, ζ#η
ρ ∆,∆
′
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3. X is non-principal (wlog on the left), the bottom sequent on the left
is the conclusion of @R, all of the premises on the left have ζ = ρ = 0,
and the sequent on the right has η = ρ = 0. So, the prooftree on the
left looks like 

Πi
·
·
·
Γi ⊢
αi, 0
0 X,∆i


i∈I
Γ ⊢
α, 0
0 X,∆
.
We can apply the lemma inductively, obtaining proofs of
Γi,Γ
′ ⊢
αi+β, 0
0 ∆i,∆
′;
we now complete the proof as follows

Π˜i
·
·
·
Γi,Γ
′ ⊢
αi+β, 0
0 ∆i,∆
′


i∈I
Γ,Γ′ ⊢
0, 0
0 ∆,∆
′
4. X is non-principal (wlog on the left), the bottom sequent on the left is
the conclusion of @R, and we do not have the previous case. So, the
prooftree on the left looks like

Πi
·
·
·
Γi ⊢
αi, ζi
ρi
X,∆i


i∈I
Γ ⊢
α, ζ
ρ X,∆
where, for all i, ζi < ζ. We can apply the lemma inductively, obtaining
proofs of Γi,Γ
′ ⊢
αi+β, ζi+η
ρ′
i
∆i,∆
′, where, for each i, ζ′i ≤ ζi < ζ, and
where ρ′i = max(ρi, η): we now complete the proof as follows

Π˜i
·
·
·
Γi,Γ
′ ⊢
α′i, ζ
′
i
ρ′
i
∆i,∆
′


i∈I
Γ,Γ′ ⊢
0, ζ
0 ∆,∆
′
and apply case 6 of Definition A.4 to adjust the values of α and ρ.
5. X is principal on both sides; there are various cases, depending on the
principal connective. We treat two of these cases: the others are very
similar.
→: The proofs are
Π1
·
·
·
Γ, Y ⊢
α1, ζ
ρ Z,∆
→ R
Γ ⊢
α, ζ
ρ Y → Z,∆
and
Π2
·
·
·
Γ′ ⊢
β1, η
ρ Y,∆
′
Π3
·
·
·
Γ′, Z ⊢
β2, η
ρ ∆
′
→ L
Γ′, Y → Z ⊢
β, η
ρ ∆
′
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with α1 < α and β1, β2 < β. We transform this into
Π˜
·
·
·
Γ,Γ′ ⊢
α1+β1, ζ#η
ρ Z,∆,∆
′
Π3
·
·
·
Γ′, Z ⊢
β2, η
ρ ∆
′
Γ,Γ′ ⊢
α+β, ζ#η
ρ ∆,∆
′
where Π˜ is produced from Π1 and Π2 by the inductive hypothesis:
we have rk(Y ), rk(Z) < ρ, α1#β1 < α#β, and β1 < α#β, so the
final inference is justified.
@: The proofs are
Π
·
·
·
Γ ⊢
α1, ζ
ρ ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk,∆
@R
Γ ⊢
α, ζ
ρ @Y,∆
and


Π′i
·
·
·
Γ′, ϕi1 , . . . , ϕiki ⊢
βi, ηi
ρ ∆
′


i∈I @L
Γ′,@Y ⊢
β, η
ρ ∆
′
where α1 < α, ηi < η for all i.
We construct a new proof as follows: the tuple ϕ1, . . . , ϕk must
match one of the tuples indexed by I: say it matches i0. So we
now have proofs
Π
·
·
·
Γ ⊢
α1, ζ
ρ ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk,∆
and
Π′i0
·
·
·
Γ′, ϕ1, . . . , ϕk ⊢
βi0 , ηi0
ρ ∆
′
∧L
Γ′, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, . . . , ϕk ⊢
βi0+1, ηi0
ρ ∆
′
·
·
·
∧L
Γ′, ϕ1 ∧ . . . l ∧ ϕk ⊢
βi0+k−1, ηi0
ρ ∆
′
We now have a proof of
Γ,Γ′ ⊢
α′, ηi0
ρ′ ∆,∆
′,
and ηi0 < η, so we can now apply case 7 of Definition A.4, and
obtain the result.

Proof of Theorem A.7 Suppose that we have a proof involving cuts, i.e. a
proof of a sequent
Γ ⊢
α, ζ
ρ+1 ∆ (22)
We prove that this proof can be replaced by a cut free proof of the same
sequent by an induction. The inductive hypothesis will be that, given such a
proof, there is a cut free proof
Γ ⊢
α′, 0
0 ∆
with some α′. We perform the induction first on ζ, then on ρ, then on α.
There are four cases.
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1. If the last inference is an application of @L, then the premises are
of the form Γi ⊢
α′i, ζi
ρi
∆i with, for all i, ζi < ζ. We can assume the
result inductively, obtaining cut free proofs of the premises, and we
can complete the proof as follows:
{Γi ⊢
α′′i , 0
0 ∆i}i∈I
@L
Γ ⊢
0, 0
0 ∆
,
which is a cut free proof of (22).
2. If the last inference is a cut of rank less than ρ, then the premises will
have the same value of ζ and ρ, but smaller values of α: inductively,
we can assume that these premises have cut free proofs. So we now
have a proof as follows:
Γ′ ⊢
α′, 0
0 X,∆
′ Γ′′, X ⊢
α′′, 0
0 ∆
′′
Γ′,Γ′′ ⊢
0, 0
ρ′ ∆
′,∆′′
with ρ′ < ρ + 1. So, by our inductive hypothesis, we can assume the
result.
3. If the last inference is a cut of rank ρ, then its premises will be of the
form
Γ′ ⊢
α′, ζ
ρ+1 ∆
′ and Γ′′ ⊢
α′′, ζ
ρ+1 ∆
′′
We can apply the result inductively to obtain cut free proofs of the
premises, which (after applying Definition A.4 case 6) can be assumed
to be of the form
Γ′ ⊢
α′, 0
ρ ∆
′ and Γ′′ ⊢
α′′, 0
ρ ∆
′′;
we then apply Lemma A.8 to obtain a proof of
Γ ⊢
α+α′, 0
ρ ∆.
We have possibly reduced the value of ζ, and certainly reduced the
value of ρ, so we can assume the result by the inductive hypothesis.
4. If the last inference is an application of a non-cut finitary rule, then
its premises must have the same value of ζ and ρ, but smaller values
of α, than the conclusion: we can again apply the result inductively to
the premises, and then apply the rule to the premises, giving a cut free
proof of (22).

Appendix B Turner’s Logic of Universal Causation
As we have indicated, Turner [31] also has a modal system which he uses
as a metatheory for the McCain-Turner procedure. His treatment has the
following features:
1. We are given an S5 modal operator, written C, and a theory T in the
language of that operator
2. Recall that a Kripke model of S5 is
(a) a set W of worlds,
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(b) a truth-functional forcing relation between worlds and proposi-
tions of the non-modal language, and
(c) an equivalence relation on the set of worlds.
We then say that an S5 Kripke model of the theory T is causally
explained if
(a) it has a single world w
(b) if any model of T has a set of worlds W which is a superset of
{w}, with a forcing relation extending that for w, then {w} is a
single equivalence class in the larger model.
(Equivalently, the inclusion of w in W is what is called a p-
morphism; see van Benthem [32, 33]).
3. Then we say that a proposition is causally explained if it is forced at
the unique world in all causally explained models.
Now this definition of a causally explained model involves not simply a model,
but all models which contain it (in some appropriate sense of ‘contain’): it is
not obvious that this definition can be replaced with one which only talks, in
the standard way, about theoremhood in a single model. In fact, as we shall
see, it cannot.
Example B.1. Consider a language with a single atom p, and two theories
in that language:
T1 = {p→ Cp} (23)
T2 = {p→ Cp,¬p→ C¬p} (24)
Then T1 has a single causally explained model: its world forces p. T2 has two
causally explained models, one with a single world forcing p, and one with a
single world forcing ¬p. Consequently, the proposition p is causally explained
by T1, but not by T2.
This has, as a consequence,
Proposition B.2. There is no set of propositions Γ such that, for any S5
theory T ,
p is causally explained by T ⇔ Γ, T ⊢S5 p.
Proof If there were such a set of propositions Γ, then the relation
p is causally explained by T
would be monotonic in T : as Example B.1 shows, it is not. 
By contrast, our logic is monotonic: it is given by a sequent calculus of the
normal sort, with the weakening rule.
Example B.3. We should consider the analogue of Example B.1 in our sys-
tem. The two theories would correspond to two different modal operators, @1
and @2, and we have :
@1p ∼= p @1 ¬p ∼=⊥
@2p ∼= p @2 ¬p ∼= ¬p
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The two sets of propositions Γi are as follows:
Γ1 = {@1p↔ p,@1¬p↔ ¬p}
= {p↔ p,¬ ⊥↔ ¬p}
= {⊤, p}
Γ2 = {@2p↔ p,@2¬p↔ ¬p}
= {p↔ p,¬p↔ ¬p}
= {⊤}.
This is in accordance with the expected results: for T1, only the world which
forces p is causally explained, and so Γ1 (essentially) contains only p. For T2,
both worlds are causally explained (both the one which forces p and the one
which forces ¬p), and Γ2 is essentially vacuous.
So, although our modal logic and Turner’s yield the same sets of causally ex-
plained models (and hence the same sets of causally explained propositions),
they have radically different properties. Ours is monotonic and has a well-
behaved proof theory: Turner’s is non-monotonic and, as it stands, does not
have a proof theory. Although Turner’s system is formulated using S5, Propo-
sition B.2 shows that we cannot, in any obvious way, use the proof theory of
S5 as a proof theory for his system.
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